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Nontechnical Summary
Convergence is a catchy concept, but one that organizes serious thinking
in diverse areas ranging from economic growth, theoretical econometrics,
nance, European politics and monetary union, regional planning and
geography, up through but not ending at entertainment and multi-media
technology, and the software industry. And, in practically every instance,
the term convergence is used with a dierent meaning.
However, that convergence suers from this meaning-overload should
not disguise its importance. In studying cross-country patterns of growth,
convergence refers to whether currently poorer economies have the op-
portunity to catch up with those currently richer. When one considers
the magnitudes involved here, the implications for economic welfare are
anything but unimportant. Some countries have been doubling their per
capita incomes every decade; yet others have been stagnant, with levels
of per capita income a hundred times lower than those of the leading
economies. Such back-of-the-envelope facts are obvious and easy to ob-
tain. But are there empirical regularities beyond them that are useful for
advancing our understanding about the process of economic growth?
Turn next to regional planning and discussions on social cohesion
across Europe: there, one might wish to know whether poorer regions are
languishing, currently and forever far behind the richer ones, or whether
they face any possibility of catching up. Just as before, here, one seeks
an empirical characterization on such dynamic possibilities that is su-
ciently precise and apposite to allow better understanding of the conse-
quences of alternative policy scenarios.
Questions like those I have just described concern the behavior over
time of cross-section distributions of income (or output or welfare): the
issues are, writ large to the scale of macroeconomies or regions, the same
as those that have traditionally been the concerns of research on the
dynamics of inequality and personal income distributions. Are the distri-
butions collapsing, so that everyone shows a tendency to become equally
well o? Instead, are the distributions increasing in dispersion, so that
those relatively better o are getting more so? Or, are the distributions
tending towards shapes that show clusters and subgroups, so that the
population is polarizing and then stratifying into distinct classes? Such
questions are useful for appreciating patterns of cross-country growth,
just as they are for understanding patterns of dynamics and mobility in
individuals' incomes within societies.
But while showing similarities, this new, macro-oriented research also
diers from the earlier work on the dynamics of personal income distribu-
tions. The dierences manifest in two signicant ways: empirically in the
range of data available; and theoretically in the types of hypotheses used
to explain particular patterns of inequality across economies. Despite
the dierences, it is apparent that the macro growth research and the
micro social-welfare, income distribution work should each have insights
to share with the other.
Recognizing the connections across these dierent areas of economic
research is, however, a relatively recent development. (Note that I re-
fer here to the modelling of cross-section patterns of aggregate economic
growth using explicit models of distribution dynamics; the connection
between aggregate growth and income distributions within an aggregate
economy is, of course, already a classical, much-studied question.) Tra-
ditional analyses of growth and convergence focus on cross-section \con-
vergence" regressions, and hypothesize in terms of production-function
accounting. Such work did not much aspire to understanding the dynam-
ics of the entire distribution|andwhen they did, they typically got things
wrong. Newer analyses draw empirical basis from explicit models of dis-
tribution dynamics, and theorize on the incentive structure underlying
group- and coalition-formation in economic growth (for, in one reading,
that is what the empirics suggest to be important).
The dierence across traditional and newer analyses is not simply
cosmetic. As just one example, compare the following. Key ndings from
traditional analyses are that convergence occurs at the rate of 2% per
year, and that that implies physical capital's factor share is larger than
that reported in national income accounts. By contrast, key ndings in
the newer analyses include that the cross-section distribution of incomes
across countries is polarizing into rich and poor, with the middle-income
group eventually vanishing. Both ndings derive from the same data.
Both are technically correct. However, the two pictures of world income
dynamics depicted dier dramatically. And, the dierent empirical nd-
ings motivate entirely dierent lines of theoretical research.
The traditional line of analysis takes itself to be a test of a particu-
lar theoretical growth model. The newer, distribution-dynamics approach
also provides a test of the same growth-model predictions, but then, si-
multaneously, further seeks to quantify dynamic patterns of growth and
inequality across countries. The traditional line of research focuses on fur-
ther rening production-function estimation and accounting. The newer
approach seeks to understand the economics behind cross-country in-
teraction and coalition-formation, and provides insight on, among other
things, how new technologies and patterns of production and communi-
cation imply alternative congurations of group dynamics.
To draw an exaggerated analogy, both lines of inquiry might well
place technical progress at center stage in their theoretical analyses of eco-
nomic growth: But one approach leads to a focus on objects like high-tech
titanium nonstick frying pans which, undoubtedly, expand the production
function|but have no implications for how dierent economies behave
relative to one another. The other leads to studying the implications
of high-technology developments in aecting the nature of cross-country
interaction, and through that aggregate growth. The move in reality
towards knowledge-based, dematerialized economies|embodied in soft-
ware, broad-bandwidth communication, and information- and content-
intensive consumption|must underscore the increasing and greater rele-
vance of this second approach.
This paper provides a brief critical review of both traditional and
recent work in this area. It points to where subsequent empirical research
is needed, and suggests alternative theoretical ideas to explore.
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ABSTRACT
Convergence concerns poor economies catching up with rich ones. At is-
sue is what happens to the cross sectional distribution of economies, not
whether a single economy tends towards its own steady state. It is the
latter, however, that has preoccupied the traditional approach to con-
vergence analysis. This paper describes an alternative body of research
that overcomes this shortcoming in the traditional approach. The new
ndings|on persistence and stratication; on the formation of conver-
gence clubs; and on the distribution polarizing into twin peaks of rich
and poor|suggest the relevance of a class of theoretical ideas, dierent
from those surrounding the production-function accounting traditionally
favored.
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I. Introduction
Conventional analyses of economic growth and convergence address one natural
set of questions. What is the contribution of physical capital to output? Knowing
this allows us to understand or explain patterns of growth by pointing to rates of
capital accumulation. How quickly can poor countries catch up with richer ones?
What factors aid this convergence? Appreciating these gives us perspective on
the relative levels of development that we observe across dierent countries, and
insight into how poor countries can improve their circumstances.
There is a traditional approach to answering such questions: estimate a cross-
section regression of growth rates on income levels, possibly including other vari-
ables on the right hand side of that regression. In this reasoning, the levels coe-
cient informs on both capital's contribution to output and the rate at which poor
economies catch up with those richer. (Whether this catch up occurs is known as
the convergence hypothesis.) Such an equation relating growth rates and levels
takes on added signicance when we recall that it has a form that can be derived
from theoretical growth models. This traditional approach thus seems doubly
blessed. It sheds light on important economic questions; it dovetails neatly with
theoretical reasoning. This is the standard to which all empirical analysis strives.
What, in this traditional approach, could be controversial?
This paper argues that conventional analyses miss altogether key aspects of
economic growth and convergence. The reason is the following. One dimension of
growth is the mechanism by which agents in an economy push back technological
and capacity constraints; this increases aggregate output. When the mechanism
works spectacularly well, we consider the economy a growth success. Such eco-
nomic progress is germane to rich countries, just as it is to poor ones|there need
be no distinction between them. A dierent dimension of growth, however, is the
mechanism that determines the relative performance of rich and poor economies:
does growth in poorer economies lead to their catching up with the richer ones?
Here, one wants to know if economic progress occurs dierently in poorer economies
than it does in richer ones.
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The two mechanisms|pushing back and catching up|are related, but log-
ically distinct: one can occur without the other. For brevity, I will refer to the
rst as a growth mechanism, and the second as a convergence mechanism. As
with all such taxonomies, the distinction is imperfect, but, we will see, is better
than nothing. Taking the distinction seriously means, temporarily, divorcing the
convergence hypothesis from issues of any one country's productivity performance.
What is important for convergence is how economies perform relative to each other,
not how a single economy performs relative to its own history. Obviously, both
growth and convergence mechanisms matter: to make progress in understanding,
however, the details of one are usefully abstracted away to focus on the other.
This paper argues that a key shortcoming of the traditional approach is that
it fails to distinguish these two dimensions of economic growth. Theoretical and
empirical statements made about one are taken, inappropriately, to apply to the
other. Consequently, theoretical insights recognizing the distinction are unavail-
able in the standard approach.
I will describe below a body of newer empirical research that repairs this
shortcoming. This work models directly the dynamics of the cross-section distri-
bution of countries. In doing so, it uncovers regularities fundamentally dierent
from those in conventional analyses. This research provides evidence on persis-
tence and stratication; on the formation of convergence clubs; and on the cross
section distribution polarizing into twin peaks of rich and poor.
Such regularities raise intriguing questions. What economic structures pro-
duce these dynamics? What mechanisms determine club formation and member-
ship? Is it only those already-rich economies that converge towards each other,
leaving the poor to form a dierent convergence club? What features of cross-
country interaction generate polarization and stratication? When physical cap-
ital ows more freely from one part of the world to another, does that lead to a
spreading out of the distribution|so that the rich get richer and the poor, poorer?
Or, does the opposite happen, and the poor have opportunity to become richer
than those previously rich? In addressing these questions, the researcher is led
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to draw on fresh theoretical ideas, in ways hidden to the traditional approach.
Thus, these distribution-dynamics empirics not only repair the failure in the tra-
ditional approach to accurately represent reality, they also generate new theories
on economic growth and convergence.
The discussion below concentrates on income distributions across countries.
It directly applies, however, to convergence and growth in other economic units as
well. Thus, the criticisms of the traditional approach extend readily. They imply
that the traditional approach cannot at all address the concerns of policy-makers
interested in regional development, economic and geographical redistribution, and
comparative economic performance. Instead, revealing analysis must be found
elsewhere|possibly in extensions of the models of distribution dynamics described
below.
The goal of the rest of this paper is to esh out the points just made. The
paper is not intended as a broad survey of all possible criticisms of the traditional
approach. Rather, the coverage is selective. Section II highlights those aspects of
conventional analyses relevant to the current discussion. Section III describes that
class of newer empirical ndings that use distribution dynamics, and indicates the
theoretical issues raised in such work. Section IV concludes.
II. The Traditional Approach
Traditional empirical analyses of growth and convergence derive from an elegant
theoretical insight. This is that, in many growth models, equilibrium growth rates
can be shown to be related to income levels through physical capital's relative
contribution to national income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin [3]; Romer [29]; Sala-i-
Martin [30, 31]). Developed explicitly, this insight gives a \convergence equation"
with growth on the left-hand side, explained by|among other things|income
levels on the right.
In this reasoning, the cross-country correlation between growth rates and in-
come levels is doubly interesting. It sheds light on the rate at which poor economies
catch up with rich ones. Simultaneously, it informs on physical capital's impor-
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tance for growth. Estimated on a wide range of data, this correlation implies a
stable uniform rate of convergence equal to 2% a year. Thus, while the poor do
eventually catch up with the rich, the speed with which this happens is low: only
half the gap between rich and poor is closed in 35 years. Moreover, the implied
contribution of physical capital to aggregate output is high|much higher than
suggested by factor income shares in national income accounts.
The second of these implications raises a puzzle: If it is physical capital that
is driving growth, why isn't it being properly compensated by the market? This
basic question has motivated research on externalities and endogenous technolog-
ical progress (Romer [28]). Such research seeks to explain the observed empirical
regularities on convergence rates and capital's factor income share. At the same
time, it resolves deep theoretical subtleties in the theory of economic equilibrium
with nonrival commodities.
In the taxonomy earlier given, such analyses provide powerful insights on the
growth mechanism. However, whether they help us understand the convergence
mechanism hinges on auxiliary assumptions. What is the nature of interaction
across dierent countries? Are currently leading economies always the rst to push
back technology frontiers, and does new technology then always lter passively to
poorer economies? Are there costs of adoption that lead to leap-frogging, where it
is the temporarily follower economies that jump to being leader, because they nd
it easier to exploit new discoveries? Or, do persistent advantages accrue to the
leader, richer countries, simply by virtue of their already being leader and richer?
Do poorer economies need to overcome poverty-trap barriers before they can hope
to catch up with richer ones?
Traditional cross-section regressions on the \convergence equation" can ad-
dress none of these issues. That they are revealing for the coecient of physical
capital in a production function is just that, no more and no less. Such exercises,
while using dynamic information creatively, are part of a time-honored practice
in production-function accounting, and might be usefully compared to empirical
analyses like those in Griliches and Ringstad [13]. However, absent auxiliary as-
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sumptions, they give no insight on whether poor countries are catching up with
rich ones.
I show below that all the dierent possibilities relating rich and poor, de-
scribed two paragraphs above, are consistent with a \stable uniform 2% rate of
convergence"|as estimated from the traditional convergence equation. Thus, a
negative correlation between growth rates and levels says nothing about the poor
catching up with the rich.
1
Contrary to claims made elsewhere, traditional em-
pirics are completely silent on the important convergence dimension in economic
growth.
To see this, I need to make explicit some ideas|empirical and theoretical|on
the dynamics of large cross sections. We turn to this next.
III. Distribution Dynamics
This section develops models of distribution dynamics to study the convergence
hypothesis.
2
Fix a year|say t|and consider the then-extant empirical distribution of per
capita incomes across countries. Suppose that the density of that distribution is as
plotted, at time t, in Fig. 1. That density shows some rich countries in the upper
1
Sometimes, evidence on that negative correlation comes only with additional
conditioning, hence the term conditional convergence. Sometimes, in the tradi-
tional approach, that evidence is buttressed also with evidence on cross-sectional
standard deviations. While this last is marginally helpful, it remains potentially
misleading: the next section shows why. As for conditional convergence, even in the
best of all possible scenarios, all it could show is whether each country converges to
its own steady state, dierent from that of other countries. It is a complete puzzle
to me how this can be interesting for whether the poor are catching up with the
rich.
2
Emphases on the empirics of distribution characteristics and dynamics ap-
peared earlier in the personal income distribution literature, e.g., Atkinson [1] and
Shorrocks [32].
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part of the distribution; a majority of middle-income countries in the middle part
of the distribution; and some poor countries, in the lower.
There is a density for each year: Fig. 1 plots, at t + s, the density at some
date in the future from t. As drawn, two suggestive classes of features of Fig. 1
should be noted. The rst class constitutes the location, shape, and other exter-
nal characteristics of the distributions at dierent times: these can, in general,
uctuate. The second comprises the intra-distribution dynamics, or churning-like
behavior|indicated by arrows in Fig. 1|when individual economies transit from
one part of the distribution to another. We consider these dierent features in
turn.
Fig. 1 has drawn the income distribution at t+s to be bimodal or twin-peaked:
in the picture, there is a group of the rich, collecting together; a group of the poor,
collecting together; and a middle-income class, vanishing.
3
There is no a priori
reason for this. The t+ s distribution might well have been unimodal, and tightly
concentrated at a single point: then, the researcher could, with some condence,
say the originally poor at t had, by t+s, attained equal footing with the originally
rich. The researcher might even want to call that catching up.
4
If time t+ s is within the researcher's data sample, then a hypothesized ten-
dency towards twin-peakedness can be examined directly from observed data. If,
however, time t+ s is beyond the available sample, then a model is needed before
the researcher can reach a conclusion on this.
Is the twin-peakedness drawn in Fig. 1 more than just whimsy and artistic
license? Below, I describe empirical techniques to study this. The quick answer is
that the world cross-section of countries does show such tendencies. There is even
3
Why say \twin peaks" rather than just \bimodal", or make up the word \twin-
peakedness" rather than simply use \bimodality"? Despite having more letters,
the former contain fewer syllables.
4
Something like this must be what European Commission policy makers have
in mind when they talk about achieving cohesion or equity across rich and poor
regions in Europe.
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evidence that twin-peakedness can already be observed for t+s within current data
samples. However, twin-peakedness will certainly not be seen if all the researcher
does is calculate means, standard deviations, third moments, and so on, of the
cross-section distributions.
Turn now to intra-distribution dynamics. It does not take a high-tech econo-
metrician to note that, in the world, there are some rich countries that have re-
mained rich for long periods of time, and, similarly, that there are some poor
countries that have remained poor. Casual observation also readily comes up
with examples of rich countries that have transited to being relatively poor; poor
countries, to relatively rich; and groups of countries, beginning at similar levels of
development, eventually diverging, with some becoming richer, and others, poorer.
(Korea and the Philippines are the usual examples for the last.) Put briey, one
sees a broad range of intra-distribution dynamics.
Next consider the intra-distribution arrows drawn in Fig. 1. Just as cross-
sectional standard deviations give no insight on potential twin-peakedness in the
distribution, they say nothing about churning within the cross section. Under-
standing these intra-distribution dynamics, however, would inform on the dynam-
ics of the poor catching up with the rich. It would inform on the poor stag-
nating within poverty traps; on the poor overtaking those previously rich; and
on convergence club dynamics|sub-groups or clubs forming, with member coun-
tries converging towards each other, and diverging away from dierent clubs. It
would shed light on possibilities for the poorest 5% of the cross section catching
up with the richest 5%; and on whether global development takes multi-tier forms.
Intra-distribution dynamics include information on switches in ranks|the leading
country falling to seventeenth position, or vice versa|but, more than that, they
also include information on the distance traversed when such switches happen.
I have just described some characteristics of (cross-country income) distri-
bution dynamics that will be of interest in discussing convergence. Formalizing
this description oers two payos: rst, precise statistical quantication; second,
theoretical analysis based on economic ideas.
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The simplest useful model of distribution dynamics is one where a stochastic
dierence equation describes the evolution of the sequence of distributions. Let F
t
denote the time t cross-country income distribution. Associated with each F
t
is a
probability measure 
t
, where
8 y 2 R : 
t
(( 1; y]) = F
t
(y):
A stochastic dierence equation describing distribution dynamics is then

t
= T

(
t 1
; u
t
); integer t; (1)
where f u
t
: integer t g is a sequence of disturbances, and T

is an operator map-
ping the Cartesian product of probability measures with disturbances to prob-
ability measures. (Needless to say, the rst-order specication in (1) is just a
convenience for the discussion. Nothing substantive hinges on it, and the model
easily generalizes to higher-order dynamics.)
Since our concerns include intra-distribution dynamics, equation (1) has to
record more than just means and standard deviations or, more generally, a nite
set of moments of the distribution sequence fF
0
; F
1
; : : : g. Equation (1) takes
values that are measures, rather than just scalars or nite-dimensioned vectors,
and thus diers from the typical time-series model.
The structure of T

reveals if dynamics like those in Fig. 1 occur. Estimated
from observed data, T

allows empirical quantication of those dynamics. Eco-
nomic hypotheses restrict T

in particular ways: they therefore provide predictions
on how 
t
, and thus the distributions F
t
, evolve over time.
Just as in time-series analysis, the researcher might seek to understand T

by its \impulse response function": set the disturbances u to zero, and run the
dierence equation forwards.
T

(
t+s 1
; 0) = T

(T

(
t+s 2
; 0); 0)
.
.
.
= T

(T

(T

: : : (T

(
t
; 0); 0; ) : : : 0); 0);
(2)
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with the result being a proxy for 
t+s
. Then, convergence in country incomes
to equality might be represented by (2) tending, as s ! 1, towards a degener-
ate point mass. Alternatively, the world polarizing into rich and poor might be
represented by (2) tending towards a two-point measure: the implied limit dis-
tribution F
t+s
; s ! 1, would then be bimodal or twin-peaked. More generally,
stratication into dierent convergence clubs might manifest in (2) tending to-
wards a multi-point, discrete measure, or equivalently, a multi-modal distribution.
How quickly a given initial distribution, F
0
, evolves into the limiting distribution,
F
t+s
; s!1, can be read o T

's (spectral) structure.
Finally, T

also contains information on intra-distribution dynamics. Exploit-
ing that structure, one can quantify the likelihood of the poor catching up with
the rich, and characterize the (random) occurrence times for such events.
In summary, studying T

informs on all the interesting issues in convergence
analysis. What then does empirical evidence|the Summers-Heston [33] data|tell
us about T

and Fig. 1? Desdoigts [8], Lamo [14], Paap and van Dijk [19], and
Quah [20, 21, 24] take the approach of estimating|in some form|the operator
T

. Some of this work views estimating T

as an exercise in nonparametric anal-
ysis, others, in semi-parametrics; yet others take discretizations of , whereupon
T

becomes just a stochastic matrix. The important insight driving these meth-
ods is not a technical one, say, of greater exibility in estimating a \convergence
equation" regression. Rather, it is that all these methods provide a global, entire
picture of what happens with incomes across countries. For cross-country data,
all the research just mentioned nd T

having features that imply \twin-peaks"
dynamics.
5
Estimated T

's indicate that clustering or clumping together of coun-
try incomes|convergence club behavior|occurs eventually. Estimated T

's reveal
precise descriptions of events where economies, initially starting out close together,
diverge over time towards either of the twin peaks. Thus, the empirical evidence
shows all the features hypothesized in Fig. 1.
5
Ben-David [4] takes a dierent approach, but with end results that have the
same interpretation.
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Durlauf and Johnson [10] side-step directly analyzing T

. Instead, they es-
timate cross section regressions, but allow the regression to \adapt" subsamples,
depending on data realizations. This innovative empirical technique permits con-
sistently uncovering local basins of convergence. Durlauf and Johnson nd evidence
for the kind of multi-modal behavior depicted in Fig. 1. They interpret their nd-
ings as multiple regimes; in the distribution-dynamics framework here, multiple
regimes and multi-modality are indistinguishable.
Bianchi [6] takes yet a third approach to studying twin-peakedness. As in
Durlauf and Johnson [10], Bianchi eschews dealing directly with T

. Actually,
he goes even further, and considers each distribution F
t
, in isolation, ignoring
dynamic information. Bianchi estimates each F
t
non-parametrically, and then
applies to each a bootstrap test for multi-modality. He nds that in the early part
of the sample (the early 1960s), the data show unimodality. However, by the end
of the sample (the late 1980s) the data reject unimodality in favor of bimodality.
Since Bianchi imposes less structure in his analysis|nowhere does he consider T

dynamics|one can reasonably guess that his ndings are more robust to possible
misspecication. Here again, twin-peakedness manifests.
It is obvious that calculating standard deviations or any other moment of
the cross section distribution can show nothing about twin-peaks dynamics. The
cross-section correlation between growth rates and income levels reveals even less,
its interpretation plagued by a version of Galton's Fallacy.
6
However, operator T

can shed light on that seductive intuition|the poor growing faster and thereby
catching up with the rich|that growth-on-levels regressions wish to exploit. Quah
[24] calculates, from an estimated T

, the probability density of passage times
from poor parts of the income distribution to rich parts.
7
He nds that although
6
This connection is made in Friedman [11] and Quah [21, 25]. Quah [25] also
details why no combination of -convergence and -convergence (in the termi-
nology of Barro and Sala-i-Martin [3] and Sala-i-Martin [30, 31]) can provide a
satisfactory work-around.
7
Durlauf and Johnson [9] have studied similar phenomena in the dynamics of
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growth miracles|the Hong Kongs, the South Koreas, and the Singapores|can
happen with reasonable positive probability, the passage time from the bottom
5% percentile to the top, given the magnitude of the gap extant, averages in the
hundreds of years. Thus, persistence and immobility characterize the world cross
section of country incomes.
8
(Although their being stated with T

-induced preciseness is new with the
body of research that I have just summarized, all such empirical facts have long
been used informally in work such as Lucas [16, 17].)
What new economic ideas do these distribution dynamics suggest? These dy-
namics draw attention towards the nature of cross-country interactions|although,
to be clear, not entirely away from production function accounting. They suggest
that an appropriate test of economic ideas about the convergence hypothesis will
come from looking at implications on how the entire cross section distribution
evolves, not from studying the behavior of a single, representative economy.
A theoretical model of distribution dynamics|in generational earnings|was
developed by Loury [15]. Many of those technical modelling ideas apply here as
well, although the current emphasis on clustering and coalition formation across
individual elements of the distribution is novel. This focus on cross-sectional group-
ing does, however, mesh with recent econometric research (Brock and Durlauf [7];
Manski [18]).
That particular economic features|threshold externalities, capital market
imperfection, heterogeneity, country size, club formation|might produce \twin
peaks" dynamics across countries can be seen in theoretical models in Azariadis
and Drazen [2], Galor and Zeira [12], Quah [24, 26], and Tamura [34]. Quah [24, 26]
personal income distribution.
8
It is worth noting that similar twin-peaks features do not describe every such
macro income distribution sequence. Compare what I have just said of the world
cross section of countries with, for example, US and European regional behavior,
e.g., Quah [25, 27]. The last-named of these studies Quah [27] has also experi-
mented with conditioning on spatial eects.
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most closely relates the theoretical message in these papers to empirical analysis.
The theoretical model in Quah [26] describes economic forces that determine
coalition or convergence club formation. That model shows why \conditional con-
vergence" in the traditional approach can be misleading: When dierent con-
vergence clubs form, factor inputs (e.g., human capital) and social characteris-
tics (e.g., democracy) will endogenously align around values determined by each
country's convergence club. Conditioning on such \explanatory variables" leads
the researcher using the traditional approach to conclude, erroneously, that it is
those variables that determine a country's economic position. By contrast, in
the model, it is the factors deciding club membership that determine everything.
The traditional researcher never nds those, and incorrectly attributes growth and
convergence to factor inputs and social characteristics. Moreover, because in that
traditional approach, the researcher only estimates a cross-section regression, he
sees only the behavior of the (conditional) representative economy. He will never
detect the multi-peakedness that arises in the cross-country distribution.
Similar lessons manifest in the model in Quah [24]. Here, it is varying degrees
of capital market imperfectness that lead to twin-peaks dynamics in the model.
In the traditional approach, the researcher might simply proxy the capital market
imperfectness by interest rates, say. However, in the model, all countries eventually
have equal rates of return for borrowing and investment. The traditional researcher
therefore never nds out the reason why twin-peaks dynamics occur|not that he
ever even realizes their presence. Moreover, the model predicts that every country
converges (in a univariate sense) to its own steady state at an identical rate shared
by all other countries. The traditional researcher then nds exactly a globally
stable, constant rate of \convergence" in the traditional conditional convergence
regression. Such a nding, however, sheds no light on the actual distribution
dynamics occurring.
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IV. Conclusion
With hindsight, the key point in this paper is obvious. Convergence concerns
poor economies catching up with rich ones. What one wants to know here is,
What happens to the entire cross sectional distribution of economies, not whether
a single economy is tending towards its own, individual steady state. However,
it is the latter that has preoccupied the traditional approach. Proposed xes
to that approach (e.g., the increased emphasis on -convergence in Sala-i-Martin
[30]) continue to miss the principal important features of economic growth and
convergence.
Such criticisms would be merely idle if there weren't alternative empirics that
appropriately address the key issues relevant to convergence analysis. This paper
has described a rich and growing body of research that does exactly that. The
new ndings reported here|on persistence and stratication; on the formation of
convergence clubs; on the distribution polarizing into twin peaks of rich and poor|
suggest the relevance of a class of theoretical ideas, dierent from the production-
function accounting favored by the traditional approach. It might, ultimately, be
those factors that are important for growth, not just crudely boosting the inputs
in a neoclassical production function.
Many issues remain to be researched in this alternative approach. The em-
pirical analyses of distribution dynamics can be substantially rened: Quah [22,
23] explore some ways to do this. Theoretical models for cross-country, or more
general social, interaction (e.g., Benabou [5]; Brock and Durlauf [7]; Quah [26],
among many others) provide new insights on how economies evolve|and, in turn,
generate intriguing new predictions to be studied empirically.
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